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Abstract
This review focuses on a recent publication from the
New Zealand Institute of Economic Research: Chris
Nixon and John Yeabsley (2002) New Zealand’s Trade
Policy Odyssey: Ottawa, via Marrakech, and On,
Research Monograph 68, Wellington: NZIER. It
attempts to add value to this useful monograph through
additional reflections on lessons from past experience
on addressing the central issue of “how best does a small
open economy on the edge of the world conduct its trade,
and particularly its trade policy, in an efficient and
effective manner?” It illustrates the dangers of paralysis
of decision-making through excessive political concern
about achieving consensus. The growing importance of
services, multinational organisations and environmental
issues in international trade negotiations increases the
complexity of the issues facing negotiators. So too does
the increasing significance of bilateral and regional
arrangements in the policies of important trading
partners, many of them still wedded to high protection
for agriculture. The review discusses the implications
of these changes. It discusses the contributions non-
governmental organisations have made, and can make,
to extending the effectiveness of official negotiators,
for example, in research and in the processes of
negotiation, and how they can be most effectively
harnessed. It also raises issues arising from the changing
nature of the debate about effective government
assistance to domestic producers engaged in trade, and
whether the public sector needs to reconsider the
structure and methods of coordination of the official
agencies involved in trade negotiation.
Introduction
How best does “a small open economy on the edge
of the world conduct its trade, and particularly its
trade policy, in an efficient and effective manner”?
This is the key issue addressed by Chris Nixon and
John Yeabsley in their research monograph, published
by the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research
in 2002.
The Institute has done a lot of useful work on trade
policy in recent years. The authors of this monograph
were concerned that there had been only limited
thoughtful discussion of the way the process of
international trade policy actually works. They
therefore set out to remedy that deficiency in part by
developing a simple model of the process and using it
as a basis to examine several important episodes in
our trade policy history. They draw heavily on written
records and interviews with people involved in the
negotiation process.
The model they use to organise their discussion
concentrates on the interaction between the various
elements of the trade policy process. Aims,
preparations and resources are decided on
domestically to produce what is planned to be a
favourable outcome after the negotiation. Other
countries react to these initial positions, producing
outcomes over the short and long term. International
realities condition the process, for example, through
changes in technology, differing regional growth
rates and the changing composition of world demand.
There is a good discussion of the particular
characteristics of a small state in the negotiation
process. The authors emphasise that, while a small
state like New Zealand has little aggregate power in
negotiation, and has to be a policy taker, it may have
some structural power to position itself relative to
others in the context of a specific issue of mutual
interest. Three ingredients – commitment, available
alternatives and control (meaning the ability of the
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state to be able to achieve an outcome outside the
negotiating framework) – may enable a small state to
enhance its negotiating position in any particular
situation.
To be useful in this way requires the ability to be
opportunistic and entrepreneurial; the capacity to come
up with innovative ideas for progress; and capacity to
propose novel solutions to the inevitable sticking points in
any negotiation. This in turn demands a system with focus
and commitment, quality staff resources, very good
intelligence about the situation of other players and real
flexibility. Flexibility and flair in negotiation must be
based on reasonable domestic consensus, focus on a
limited number of objectives, the right relationship between
the authorities and the negotiators, long-term commitment
to the process and understanding of specific circumstances
in the negotiation.
The negotiators must have access to and understand
the analytical capacity to know what will lose or gain
advantage in the negotiation, and be equipped with the
right tools and language to interact with those around the
negotiating table and sound judgment based on on-the-
job experience. Whether the outcome of the negotiation
will be sustainable in the long run depends on whether the
agreement is economically logical and coherent.
This analytical framework is applied to five illustrative
episodes of New Zealand’s trade policy history. The first
covers the post-World War I situation leading to the
development of Commonwealth preferences at Ottawa.
The second is the post-World War II period culminating
in the access of the United Kingdom to the European
Economic Community in 1973. The third is the negotiation
of what we have come to know as CER, the trade
agreement with Australia in 1983. The fourth and most
interesting discussion is of the Uruguay round of
multilateral negotiations and the development and role of
the Cairns group in them. A final, relatively brief section
looks at APEC. In all cases, attention is paid to the process
of negotiation, the role that New Zealand negotiators
played in the process and the extent to which they were
able to influence the outcomes.
Assistance to Domestic Industry
The discussion pays much more attention to the
processes of negotiation designed to protect or improve
market access for New Zealand exports than to the
processes directed at rationalising New Zealand’s
approach to protecting and supporting domestic
industries in the changing external environment.
At times, the authors imply that we were always a
small open economy. There is a table on page 65 that
shows that New Zealand (and Australia) were slower
than average internationally in increasing their ratio of
export goods and services to GDP between 1965 and
1990. We were a very protected and regulated economy
in the period from the Second World War to 1983. We
retained a comprehensive system of import licensing
much longer than most other comparable countries.
Negotiation of CER in 1983 and the radical policy
changes of the late 1980s led to a rapid reduction of
protection, which seems now to be widely accepted.
This has transformed the nature of the trade policy
debate. The key issue now is not whether New Zealand
should return to the old negative methods of protection
by import licensing or high tariffs. Rather, it is to what
extent and how should the government assist New
Zealand industries to be more internationally competitive.
The Issue of Consensus
The authors place considerable weight on the importance
of consensus, defined as a favourable climate of opinion
sufficiently widespread and broadly based to suppress
the prospect of meaningful political dissent. They assert
that between 1880 and 1994 there was largely
unquestioned acceptance by New Zealanders of the
overall worth of achieving liberalisation of international
agricultural trade to allow New Zealand produce to enter
lucrative markets despite the likely price we might have
to pay to achieve it. The consensus on trade strategy
was therefore ‘straightforward’.
To the extent that this was true, it depended greatly
on New Zealand being able, as a small country, to get
away with maintaining a system of protection and subsidy
of interests other than farming without retaliation in
more important markets. In other words, if we wished to
keep our protective system, we were not asked to pay a
high ‘price’ to do so. From the late 1950s onwards, an
increasing number of informed people concluded that
our system of protection and support was becoming
increasingly irrational and damaging to the efficiency of
the economy and the growth of more competitive
activities.
ips policy paper sixteen •  3
The monograph recognises that when trade policy
issues moved away from agricultural liberalisation, as
they did in negotiation with Australia, the New Zealand
public was not prepared to accept the case without
more information and debate on the real worth of
liberalisation. When the authors say that there is now
more questioning of the costs of liberalisation, they are
in danger of obscuring the very considerable
questioning that occurred in New Zealand for over 50
years. The period of reduced debate about the merits of
lower protection has been relatively short. And how
much community consensus did the Lange-Douglas
government have at the time for the rapid deprotection
they engineered between 1984 and 1990?
Page 5 of the monograph suggests that until recently
there was “little need to engage those outside
government to develop an ongoing domestic trade
policy consensus”. There was in fact considerable
internal debate about the methods and extent of
protection from the 1950s right through the 1980s. It is
surprising that the monograph does not cover more
fully the debates that took place among officials of the
Industries and Commerce Department and other
departments involved in external trade policy during
this period. Interaction of officials on the issues involved
with advisory agencies, manufacturers, other sections
of business, trade unions and so on played a very
important part in the process of change. Protection and
support was a central preoccupation of the National
Development Conference of the late 1960s and the
planning processes that succeeded it. This interactive
process, combined with the increasingly critical
economic situation of the country, was what eventually
persuaded politicians that the old system of protection
must be changed.
Interaction with Non-government
Participants
There is a good discussion of the characteristics of small
states in negotiation and the means by which they can
exert some influence, as intermediaries or through
collective action with allies with mutual interest such
as the Cairns group. However, again there is surprisingly
little discussion of the very constructive interaction that
officials have had with other groups working in
directions favourable to New Zealand.
For example, the creation of APEC built on
considerable efforts over a long period of time by
academics in the Pacific Trade and Development
Conferences (PAFTAD) and by business people in
PBEC. In these organisations people, including
competent New Zealanders, came together to consider
the mutual interests of the countries of the Pacific. From
1980, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conferences
(PECC) brought representatives of these organisations
together with officials ‘acting in their private capacity’.
This was a useful device, in that it enabled difficult
issues to be more readily debated than if the officials had
been representing their governments. It also enabled
some members to participate, for example, the three
Chinas, which would not at the time have been
unanimously accepted in an intergovernmental
organisation.
This process enabled the New Zealanders to get a
hearing from their peers from countries of increasing
importance in New Zealand’s trade. Officials frequently
found it useful to have academics and business people
‘flying kites’ on politically difficult issues that eventually
had positive spin-offs for official negotiations. A case in
point is the useful work done by New Zealand and
Australian academic representatives in leading discussion
in PECC on ‘strengthening markets’, which later spilled
over into APEC’s work programme.
New Zealand has been especially fortunate in the
quality of its successive ministers of trade in recent years
and of the trade negotiation officials who have advised
and assisted them. The success of the campaign to
safeguard New Zealand’s exports against possible
disaster as a result of the British decision to join the EEC
is rightly attributed to the competence of Trade Minister
Marshall and his officials. Through their frequent visits
to both the United Kingdom and the Six over a ten-year
period, they built a constituency in support of the need
for safeguards for New Zealand.
The authors say that “the most influential publication”
(in Marshall’s campaign) “was a booklet entitled New
Zealand and an Enlarged EEC. It had reliable facts and
figures about the New Zealand economy and farming
and was translated into all the languages of the Six”.
They leave the impression that this was a government
document. It was in fact a document produced by the
Monetary and Economic Council, an organisation
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established as something of a watchdog over government
economic policy. Given the organisation’s reputation
for independent commentary, it was considered that this
would carry more weight in Britain and Europe than a
purely official document.
Official agencies were very helpful to the Council in
putting together material for the report and discussing
the key issues with the authors. But the final report was
the responsibility of the Council. It was used as a basis
for the more popular and shorter material produced by
Gerry Symmans and his helpers in an effective publicity
campaign.
The NZIER monograph puts considerable emphasis
on the importance of the trade negotiators being
adequately backed by long-term analytical capacity in-
house to enable them to have credibility internationally.
They express some concern that the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade is not as relatively attractive as a
career option as it once used to be. It can never hope to
be as well-resourced as its counterparts in other large
developed economies. This accentuates the importance
of ensuring that those recruited continue to be of high
quality and are given adequate opportunities to build up
long-term network relationships.
Such relationships are important, not only with their
international peers, but also with research and business
groups in New Zealand that can usefully supplement
their skills in building up international connections in
the national interest. Trade policy officials must also be
given time to think strategically about critical issues of
trade policy. In the 1980s and 1990s, several of the best
thinkers in MFAT were given the opportunity of taking
time out from their normal duties to work at the Institute
of Policy Studies, either individually, or in collaboration
with other researchers, on key issues of New Zealand’s
external relationships. A number of publications resulted
from their secondments that were valuable not only for
the work of the Ministry but also for others interested in
the community.
Relationships of MFAT with Other
Official Agencies
It is surprising that little attention is paid in the historical
sections to the role played in trade policy by other official
agencies and advisory councils. For example, the Market
Development Board (later the Trade Development
Board), on the basis of a report by the Hugo Group
Limited, played a more significant role than the
Ministry in promoting discussion and action on selling
educational services overseas. This has now become a
major source of overseas exchange earnings.
When the government changed in 1990,
consideration was given to transferring the functions
of the Board to the Ministry. The suggestion provoked
a vigorous campaign from the business community
against such a proposal, which persuaded the review
committee set up by the Minister to recommend that a
somewhat modified Board should be continued. Since
then the Ministry has paid much more attention to
building up its relationships with the business
community.
The government has now decided that the TDB
should be amalgamated with Industry New Zealand to
provide a more integrated approach to decisions on the
most suitable forms of support for New Zealand
business. Especially now that the level and methods of
protection are no longer so important as policy issues,
it remains very important that the Ministry sustains a
constructive relationship with the new organisation.
Similar considerations apply to other government
departments involved in international relations. In the
economic area, the Ministry of Economic Development
now has a large support role. It is interesting that MED,
not MFAT, now plays the organising role in the
Advanced Courses on Negotiations run by Professor
Aaron which begin under MFAT auspices.
The monograph recognises the significance of
domestic linkages in considering the importance of
focus and coordination in effective trade negotiation.
The authors suggest that consideration be given to
whether, in the new environment, New Zealand might
need to have a Ministry of Trade or a Department of
Trade and Industry again. The case for this is to
establish the strong domestic connections from which
an ongoing consensus might be forged on trade policy.
They recognise that MFAT provides a basis for
integration of trade policy with the skills and experience
associated with political international relations. In the
section on the UK and the EEC, they acknowledge that
political and defence issues and historical ties played a
very significant role in the successful outcome.
However, they do not discuss adequately the extent to
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which issues of security and political relationships are
likely to be critical factors in future trade negotiations,
particularly in bilateral and regional trade relationships
in the Americas and in East Asia.
Challenging the idea of returning to a separate DTI,
at the launch of the monograph, Simon Murdoch, now
Secretary of MFAT, argued strongly that “the conduct
of a country’s trade negotiations never takes place in
isolation from its wider foreign policy”.
New Issues in Negotiation
Looking at what lies ahead, the authors see services
becoming more prominent in international trade
negotiations and more pressure from the governments
of major economies on New Zealand for ‘concessions’
that will improve the capacity of their producers to
compete in the New Zealand market. They rightly
consider that there has been inadequate research into
the importance of services for the New Zealand
economy. They do not go into detail on this.
Nevertheless, it would be very useful, on the basis of
evaluation of past experiments and experience, to have
more analysis directed to assessing the most desirable
role of the state, overseas investment and competition
from overseas in the provision of infrastructure, such
as transport, communications and energy. Given
constraints on the capacity of governments to increase
taxation, similar considerations apply in deciding on the
best means of providing health, education and welfare
services.
Such research would equip negotiators better to
deal with issues arising, not only in services, but also
from trends towards more commercial integration and
the development of multinational enterprises. Issues
such as these have become increasingly significant for
New Zealand as the diversity of our markets, and of the
products and services in which we trade, has increased.
The authors contend that financial constraints in the
public sector tend to bear quite heavily on foreign
affairs and on the provision of funds for the long-term
research projects they consider necessary for effective
trade policy.
As our own experience in the post-war world
illustrates, powerful vested interests build up behind
walls of high protection and support. If such protection
and support is sustained for a prolonged period, a search
for consensus, if it is carried to extremes, as it was for a
time in New Zealand, can lead to paralysis of decision-
making. Liberalisation has greatly reduced that problem
in New Zealand now, even under MMP. And there was
surprising consensus among all parties, other than the
Greens, in the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and
Trade last year on the desirability of continued integration
with Australia, although some issues, such as a common
currency, bearing significantly on sovereignty, were
seen as needing more research and debate. Debate is
now more likely to be focused on such issues, on
protection of services and, both domestically and even
more so globally, on the implications of freer trade and
integration for biosecurity, the environment, labour
conditions and the distribution of income. A good base
of research is required to evaluate different means of
approaching these issues.
Agricultural Protection and Issues in
Multilateral, Regional and Bilateral
Negotiations
Unfortunately, entrenched vested interests, built up
behind walls of long-term agricultural protection and
support, are prevalent throughout the world, especially
in the more important developed countries. Some of
these are normally aligned with us in pressing for
agricultural trade liberalisation, but find it politically
very difficult to include imports of dairy products among
their ‘concessions’.
At the beginning of the chapter on APEC, the
monograph uses a quotation from Gary Hawke likening
APEC to Alcoholics Anonymous. The members have
agreed on a goal of unilaterally removing barriers to
trade by 2010 for the more developed and 2020 for the
others. As Hawke sees it, they come together from time
to time to provide mutual reassurance, and by
exchanging knowledge of their own goals, to provide
themselves reinforcement for their self-discipline. The
assumption behind this is that the reduction and eventual
elimination of barriers is in the unilateral national
interest of each member.
Unfortunately, while WTO principles see virtue in
reducing barriers to trade, the processes of the
organisation are still based on the idea of trading
‘concessions’. This implies that the country reducing
barriers is paying a price to do so. The processes have
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been relatively successful in reducing barriers to trade
in the industrial sector, but much less so in the
agricultural. And several members of APEC seen to
consider that the problems of agriculture cannot be
resolved regionally, but must be part of a global package
negotiated through WTO.
Progress was made in the Uruguay round with
some acceptance of the concept of ‘target formulas’,
whereby members would agree to reduce tariffs or
export subsidies or other support by specified
percentages over an agreed period. However, there is
obvious reluctance by many members to apply the
concept comprehensively, especially to ‘sensitive’ areas
like agriculture and textiles. In those areas, the concept
of ‘trade concessions’ is by no means dead.
New Zealand’s influence is considered in the
monograph to be in some danger as a result of the
increasing numbers of members of the WTO and the
increased role that non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) are likely to play in trade negotiations. An
issue of even greater importance is the tendency for
some bigger players to look in trade negotiations for an
‘early harvest’ on politically easy issues, leaving the
more controversial until later. The more controversial
issues frequently include agriculture.
One danger that needs to be addressed is that some
of the bigger players may see the WTO, as some see the
United Nations, as an increasingly unsatisfactory means
of achieving their objectives in international trade.
They may prefer to utilise their bargaining power in
selected bilateral or regional agreements. Given the
large number of bigger economies that are protectionist
in agricultural products of interest to New Zealand,
such a development could be very damaging for this
country.
In the circumstances, while a successful multilateral
round would be New Zealand’s first preference, its
trade policy strategy cannot be wholly concentrated on
this objective. It remains vital to develop strategies and
policies, consistent with that objective, that as far as
possible will avoid New Zealand being excluded from
bilateral or regional arrangements where exclusion
would do significant damage to our trading interests.
The Uruguay round succeeded to some extent in
setting multilateral negotiations on a path of reducing
barriers to agricultural trade. We need to do all we can,
individually and in association with others, to persuade
the governments and influential organisations in
important trading partners that it is in their own interests
to continue on that path.
The monograph appropriately recognises the
contribution made by Prime Minister Muldoon, with the
assistance of Richard Carey, then a Treasury official, in
persuading the OECD to do a special study on agricultural
protectionism in the Multilateral Trade Mandate Project.
This illuminated the inequity and inefficiency of existing
systems of protection. It was followed up by the
secondment of Professor Bruce Ross of Lincoln University
to ‘sell’ the result of the study to members. These initiatives,
the authors say, made a major contribution to securing a
place for agriculture in the Uruguay round.
As the government and its ministries make their plans
to deal with serious issues ahead, they need to evaluate the
success of initiatives such as this, including the contribution
of roving ambassadors such as Brian Chamberlain,
Malcolm Bailey and Mike Moore recruited to supplement
the work of government officials. More generally they
need to consider the possibilities of better combining the
skills of New Zealanders in business and the research
community with those of ministers and officials.
Building Bridges with Tertiary and
Research Institutions
In the past, building bridges between MFAT, academic
institutions and the private sector has not been easy. One
reason has been the effects of financial constraints on the
Ministry and academic institutions on their capacity to
release staff for joint work on strategy. The Ministry’s
efforts to obtain secondments from the private sector have
not been particularly successful. More generally, as
Richard Nottage, a former Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
observed in an address on the occasion of his retirement
in October 1999, New Zealand has a relatively small pool
of expertise in international affairs. It is also perhaps the
most under-resourced country in the OECD in
independent ‘think tanks’. As a consequence, there has
been “a dearth of independent, contestable policy ideas
and advice on political/security and economic/trade
matters”.
Nottage emphasised that there were examples of
institutions working closely and collaboratively with
government departments and officials and generally
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through them with ministers, thus definitely influencing
and adding value to official policy formulation and
advice. But his general thesis is probably still correct. If
that is so, as he said, an obvious question is whether New
Zealand is utilising to maximum effect the limited
resources available in government and academic
institutions (and he would no doubt add, in a different
context, the private sector).
In New Zealand, there is no strong tradition of
private sector funding of philanthropic foundations and
think tanks, although this is improving. The Ministry
has been an important source of funding and other
support for a number of institutions. It is the primary
source for the Institute of International Affairs and the
Asia 2000 Foundation. In addition to the secondments
mentioned earlier, Nottage noted that the Ministry has
contributed to the work of academic research institutions
in a number of other ways. These include joint ventures
in arranging programmes and speaking engagements for
distinguished visitors from overseas and some grants to
enable students and scholars to undertake research into
some aspects of international relations using the
Ministry’s archives.
Nottage said that he had been only partly successful
in his efforts to reach out to the universities for liaison on
activities that he had expected to be of mutual interest.
The relationships had not been developed in a systematic
way, according to a well thought-out strategy. He outlined
some factors that he thought might be inhibiting more
meaningful and collaborative relationships. From the
Ministry’s viewpoint, one issue was whether academic
departments or research institutions were seen as local
or as national centres of activity. The Ministry prefers to
deal with national centres or with local institutions
which reach out to other academic institutions in joint
ventures. In some cases, the Ministry found it difficult to
establish where it should ‘plug in’ to a university or
institute on particular issues, subjects or projects in
which it had an interest.
Discussing the possibility of maximising the small
pool of expertise available, which should include the
sharing of knowledge and practical experience, he raised
the question of the use of the Ministry’s pool of knowledge
and experience in institutions’ teaching programmes.
He felt that this could be a sensitive area among some
faculties and teachers. Some new recruits to the Ministry
had suggested that several university programmes on
international affairs were for the most part tangential to
New Zealand’s foreign and trade policy. They felt that
there could be scope for including more New Zealand
material, including the Ministry’s experience and
practical examples, in some of these courses.
He wondered whether part of the problem was a
perception by some university staff that their academic
independence might be compromised by closer
involvement with the core business of government
departments. He accepted that the prime functions of
university staff were education of students and academic
research. But he did not believe that ethical reservations
and risks needed to constrain closer collaboration
between academics and policy analysts in the Ministry
and/or other core government departments.
Nottage also recorded that his discussions around
the Ministry had raised what was seen as “a proliferation
problem” – there were too many small under-resourced
‘institutes’. He recalled an observation by Andrew
Knight, then Editor of The Economist, who came to New
Zealand under one of the Ministry’s visitor programmes,
and observed that “New Zealanders have a big capacity
to think small”. Nottage had noted that institutes in
Wellington had been working more closely and
collaboratively together. He believed that this helped to
make the best use of limited resources and develop a
higher quality product, whether in research, a seminar,
a conference or a visitor programme. It also made the
Ministry’s life easier and encouraged ministers to feel
that limited resources were being used to good effect.
Another good reason he saw for enhancing relations
between the Ministry and academic institutions was the
very close links between domestic and foreign policy
and the ever-increasing number of issues that had an
external, transnational dimension. He cited the
environment, labour relations, investment, human rights,
governance in both the public and private sector, and
dispute resolution, to name a few. The universities and
Institutes were uniquely placed to foster interdisciplinary
research, analysis and discussion required to the deal
with such issues where there was no one repository of
knowledge and expertise.
Things have of course moved on since 1999. Some
developments now in train in the education sector should
help overcome some of the problems Nottage mentioned.
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Collaboration among institutions is being more actively
encouraged, with a view to creating more specialised
centres of excellence and greater focus on issues of
national economic, social and environmental interest.
The new School of Government just established at
Victoria University of Wellington should help to remedy
past deficiencies of communication and interaction
between the universities and the public sector. The
government representatives have made it clear that they
want the research efforts and allocation of educational
responsibilities by the School to involve capable
academics in universities and research institutes
elsewhere in New Zealand as well as those at VUW. The
School is to be part of an Australia New Zealand School
of Government, involving collaboration with universities
and governments across the Tasman.
Initiatives of this kind should provide a useful basis
to develop strategies to generate the more effective
collaborative action on trade policy issues that this
important study by the NZIER recommends.
13 June 2003
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